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ABSTRACT: 
 
Based on the case studies of India and Sri Lanka, the paper combines conceptual 
and empirical findings on power-sharing arrangements as a key to conflict 
management in deeply divided, post-colonial societies. The two countries were 
chosen because of the similarity of their ethnopolitical conflicts but also because 
of their differences in conflict management practices and outcomes. 
For the case study on India, I argue that by applying power sharing principles the 
conflicts resulting from demands of minorities, such as homeland and linguistic 
recognition, were met through provisions based on the principle of segmental 
autonomy; demands for proportional representation in political decision-making 
were met through the specificity of “centric-regional” parties and through 
policies of reservation; whereas demands for security, such as preservation of 
cultural identity were met through segmental autonomy as well as formal and 
informal blocking rights. 
Conversely, Sri Lanka was originally blessed with favorable conditions at 
independence, but sub-optimal political choices after independence turned 
“milder ethnic conflict” into a protracted civil war. I argue that a policy based on 
a majoritarian control system was at the root of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Two interrelated claims are advanced. Based on the consociational approach, 1) 
in a deeply divided society, conflict regulation can be achieved only through 
adoption of power sharing arrangements; and based on the majoritarian 
“control” approach: 2) in a deeply divided society majoritarian practices will 
exacerbate rather than regulate a conflict. 
 
 
Keywords: deeply divided societies, conflict management, consociationalism, control 
system, elites 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The central theme of the article is predicated on the assumption that power-sharing 
arrangements are the most appropriate and successful conflict-regulating practices 
for plural and deeply divided societies. It advances two hypotheses: 1) in a 
plural/deeply divided society conflict-regulation can be achieved only through 
                                                        
1
 An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Fifteenth Annual World Convention of 
the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), held at Columbia University in the City 
of New York, April 14-16, 2011. I would like to thank the Heidelberg University Graduate 
Academy for a grant to participation in the conference. I am grateful to Subrata K. Mitra for 
his valuable comments and suggestions on this version. I would also like to thank Karl 
Cordell, Jivanta Schöttli, Stefan Wolff and two anonymous reviewers for their critical 
engagement with the earlier draft. 
2
 Radu Carciumaru is a lecturer and Ph.D. Researcher at the Department of Political Science, 
South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University. The author can be reached at 
carciumaru@sai.uni-heidelberg.de.  
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adoption of consociational
3
 arrangements; and 2) in a plural/deeply divided society 
majoritarian practices will exacerbate rather than regulate a conflict. The following 
model underpins both hypotheses (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. A composite model for conflict regulation in plural societies
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the composite model of conflict-regulation in plural societies, elite 
agency is crucial in accommodating the demands of ethnic minorities in search for 
equal opportunities and a share of power. Favorable conditions help moderate the 
strategies of the assertive segmental leaders, causing them to adopt a more balanced 
stance.
5
 Ideally, favorable conditions should enable the stakeholders (leaders) to 
regulate the conflict in its early stages, avoiding its brutal escalation.
6
 The conditions 
could be categorized into structure-oriented and actor-oriented (Schneckener 2002: 
211– 17) as shown in the following Table (Table 1): 
 
Table 1. Conditions favoring power-sharing
7
 
 
Structure-oriented conditions Actor-oriented conditions 
1. No majority segment 9. Dominant elite
8
  
2. Segments of equal size 10. External pressure  
3. Small number of segments 11. Traditions of accommodation 
4. Small population size 12. Absence of special rights claim 
5. Socio-economic equality  13. Comprehensive participation 
6. Overarching Loyalty 14. Respect for status quo 
7. Geographical concentration of segments  
8. Moderate pluralism  
 
The arrangements that will be analyzed are based on the four basic principles of 
consociational democracy
9
 as follows: 1) executive power-sharing, i.e., grand 
                                                        
3
 In my paper, I equate the term consociation with power sharing, using both of them 
interchangeably. I am aware that it represents a restrictive view-point, given that other forms 
of power sharing exist, i.e., integrative power sharing propagated by Horowitz (1985, 2000); 
see Sisk, 1996.    
4
 This is a composite model based on the “neo-institutional model of democratic change” 
(Mitra 1999, 2005), weak/strong state vs. accommodating/unaccommodating elite framework 
in solving self-determination movements (Kohli, 1997), as well as the schematic presentation 
of principal propositions of consociational theory (Lijphart 1985, p. 120). 
5
 The ‘power’ of power-sharing is that it works in both favorable and unfavorable conditions. 
6
 A large variation in the lists of favorable conditions can be found, which can be explained 
partly by the detection of new empirical cases and partly by the discussion of these factors by 
other scholars. 
7
 Based on the findings of Andeweg (2000), Lijphart (1985, 1996), Schneckener (2002), 
Steiner (1981).   
8
 ‘Dominant elite’ represents a condition that is implicitly advanced by Lijphart (1985, 1996), 
whereby political leadership is able to control and to persuade its support base. 
Plural ,  
deeply 
divided 
society 
Structural 
change 
Conflict, 
Minority 
demands 
Favorable 
conditions 
Power-
sharing  
democracy 
Political stability 
and 
democratic quality 
Majoritarian  
dictatorship 
Violence 
and 
democratic decay 
Unfavorable 
conditions 
Elite 
strategy 
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coalition; 2) segmental autonomy, i.e., both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
federalism; 3) the principle of proportionality;
 
 and 4) mutual veto, i.e., minority 
blocking rights. The principles will be empirically tested, in terms of success or 
failure, based on such needs and demands of minorities (ethnic groups) as homeland, 
(i.e., segmental autonomy - territories with no state of their own that are sufficiently 
well organized and can articulate their demands politically, their minority status is 
converted to a majority status); linguistic recognition, reservations, and security. 
 
Generally, consociational systems are characterized by institutions that facilitate 
cooperation and compromise among political leaders, maximizing the number of 
“winners” in the system to the extent that separate communities can peacefully 
coexist within the common borders of a state (Norris 2002: 207). The “control” 
approach, developed by Ian Lustick (1979: 325-44), is another strategy for solving 
the puzzle. It begins with the assumption advanced by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth 
Shepsle (1972) that plural societies cannot develop as stable democracies, but 
through “the dominant majority configuration.” This approach is characterized by 
“infrequent ethnic cooperation, immoderate ethnic politics at the expense of minority 
groups at the constitutional as well as the policy level, and eventual repression of 
minority political activity. Majoritarianism is the cause of the dominant community 
and electoral machination is its method of preserving its dominance” (Rabushka and 
Shepsle 1972: 141-142). Basically, the authors argue that a stable democracy in a 
divided society is possible to have in the absence of consociational arrangements, by 
means of a system of control. The conceptual distinctions between consociational 
and control approaches are shown in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Control vs. Consociational System (Lustick 1979)
10
 
 
Criteria  Consociational System Control System 
Effective govern of the 
authoritative allocation 
o f  resources 
The common denominator of the 
interests of segments as perceived and 
articulated by their respective elites 
The interest of the majority 
segment as perceived and 
articulated by its elite. 
Linkages between the 
two sub-units or 
segments 
Political or material exchanges: 
negotiations, bargains, trades, and 
compromises. 
Penetrative in character: the 
majority segment extracts what 
it needs from the minority 
segment and delivers what it 
sees fit. 
The significance o f  
bargaining 
Hard bargaining between elites as a 
necessary fact of political life; bargains 
are concrete signs that 
consociationalism is operating 
successfully. 
No bargaining between elites of 
the majority and minority 
segments. It would signal the 
breakdown of control as the 
means by which the political 
stability of the system is being 
maintained. 
The role o f  the State 
(i.e. civil service 
bureaucracy, law 
enforcement agencies, 
Consociational societies develop 
regimes that are in the nature of 
"umpires."11  
The official regime must translate the 
Official regime as legal and 
administrative instrument of 
the majority segment or 
group.12 
                                                                                                                                               
9
 For a brilliant overview of consociational democracy and examination of the arguments set 
forth by advocates and critics of consociationalism, see O’Leary 2005, pp. 3–43. 
10
 Lustick, Ian S. 1979. “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus 
Control”, World Politics, 31(3), pp.330-2. 
11
 “Most of an umpire's time is spent in seeing that the existing rules are obeyed and that 
deviant competitors are brought back into line. But the role also includes modifying the 
existing rules and even making new rules to cope with unanticipated disorders which may 
break out in the arena. But his goal is always the preservation of that arena.” In Lustick 1979, 
p. 330. 
12
 “The bureaucratic apparatus of the state, staffed overwhelmingly by personnel from the 
majority segment, uses what discretion is available in the interpretation and implementation 
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the courts, the public 
educational system, and 
the armed forces) 
compromises reached between elites 
into appropriate legislation.  
The type o f  normative 
justification for the 
continuation o f  the 
political order  
The political status quo is likely to be 
legitimized by general references to the 
common welfare, and by specific 
warnings of the consequences, for each 
segment, of consociational breakdown. 
Legitimacy is reached by an 
elaborate and well-articulated 
group-specific ideology (i.e. 
master narrative).  
Visual metaphor 
“a delicately but securely balanced 
scale” 
“puppeteer manipulating his 
stringed puppet” 
 
The focus of the current investigation is on comparison of two cases: India and 
Sri Lanka. They were chosen because of the similarity of their ethno-national 
conflicts but also for their different conflict-management practices and outcomes. 
The comparative study was conducted on a national-level aggregation of policy 
implementation regarding conflict-regulation following the “structured, focused 
comparison” method.13  
 
In the case of India, I will argue that due to consociational arrangements adopted, 
e.g. constitutional safeguards for religious minorities by means of balancing 
contradictory principles of equal citizenship with collective rights; or redrawing of 
state boundaries leading to the emergence of the ethnic states; India succeeded in 
managing the conflicts emerged after independence, accommodating both the 
demands of ethnic groups and assertive minorities. 
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, I will argue that despite the far more favorable 
conditions at independence, the government failed to peacefully manage the fairly 
mild political conflicts and accommodate minority assertiveness, primarily because 
of the majoritarian control system strategy pursued by the elites - a strategy of 
making Sri Lanka a unitary, centralized, “melting pot” state. Sri Lanka’s case 
effectively demonstrates Lijphart’s assertion that for plural societies the political 
choice is not between majoritarian and consociational democracy but between 
consociational democracy and no democracy at all (Lijphart 1977: 238). The case 
also confirms how easily majoritarian democracy can degenerate into majority 
dictatorship. 
 
The cases are temporally diverse. Concerning India, I “flesh out” the events from 
Independence till the present day. As to Sri Lanka, I handle the events from 
Independence till 1983. Current issues and future prospects on conflict regulation in 
India and Sri Lanka will be addressed in the concluding part of the paper. 
 
 
MANAGING DIVERSITY  
 
India, perhaps more than any country in the world, exemplifies democracy and 
diversity. India–an allegedly Hindu majority country–in its over sixty years of 
independence has had four Muslim
14
, a Sikh (Zail Singh), and a former untouchable 
                                                                                                                                               
of official regulations to benefit the segment which it represents at the expense of the 
minority segment,” in Lustick 1979, p. 330. 
13
 The method is “focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the 
historical case,” i.e., specifically those aspects that have theoretical relevance; and it is 
“structured” because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in 
that historical case. See Mahoney, James. 2004. “Structured, Focused comparison” in Lewis-
Beck, Michael S., Bryman, Alan and Tim Futing Liao (eds.) The Sage Encyclopedia Social 
Science and Research Methods, London: Sage, p.1098. 
14
 Zakir Hussain, Muhammad Hidayatullah, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Abdul Kalam. 
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(Dalit K.R. Narayanan) as presidents. Currently, the Head of State is a woman, the 
Prime minister is a Sikh, and both a woman and a Christian are united in the person 
of Sonia Gandhi - chairperson of the ruling coalition UPA and for many, the most 
powerful leader of the government without actually holding a post in it. Moreover, 
India officially celebrates 5 Hindu national holidays, but also 4 Muslim, 2 Christian, 
1 Buddhist, 1 Jain and 1 Sikh holiday in recognition of its diversity (Pandey 2006: 
90). At first glance, minorities seem to be accommodated and integrated in India’s 
democracy.  
 
However, many scholars, political scientists, and area specialists have described 
democracy in India as a paradox, miracle or conundrum
15
. Aside from a short 
intermezzo during the Emergency years (1975-1977), albeit equally important
16
 for 
its democratic institutions, India has been a democracy for over 60 years. The 
problems facing the country then and now are serious and grave, ranging from the 
insurgencies (Naxalites) and cross-border terrorism, separatist and secessionist 
struggles (Tamils, Sikhs, Nagas, Mizos, Kashmiris etc.) to atrocities against 
minorities, discrimination based on caste prejudice, as well as corrupted and 
criminalized politicians and police.
17
 Their problems notwithstanding, India’s 
democracy is rooted in the identity of its citizens who cherish their achievement of 
being called the “world’s largest democracy”.  
 
In describing the nature of leadership in democracies, particularly India’s 
democracy, Guha (2007) pointedly reached the following conclusion: “In India, the 
sapling [of democracy] was planted by the nation’s founders, who lived long enough 
(and worked hard enough) to nurture it to adulthood. Those who came afterwards 
could disturb and degrade the tree of democracy but, try as they might, could not 
uproot or destroy it” (Guha 2007: 745). 
 
The myriad of problems emerging from India’s diversity, which Nehru 
famously dismissed as “fissiparous tendencies,” have found at both the state and 
national level different solutions and strategies, ranging from repression, in the 
words of a senior IPS officer, “hit them over the head with a hammer, then teach 
them how to play the piano”18 to power sharing, thus transforming “the rebels into 
stakeholders,” resulting in accommodation and political integration.19   
 
Ironically, one of the fiercest critics of consociationalism –Paul Brass– asserted 
that India’s success in managing the conflicts and accommodating both the demands 
of ethnic groups and assertive minorities that emerged after independence was due to 
consociational arrangements.
20
 To extend Brass’s statement, whenever a conflict 
                                                        
15
 “even sensational displays of Hindu Nationalism, civil war in Kashmir, and unending 
insurgency did not dislodge India from relatively high-capacity democracy. We might regard 
India either as a miracle or as conundrum.” in Tilly, 2007, p. 54. Some of them have not 
given India’s democracy even a fair chance to survive, see: Harrison, Selig S. 1960: India: 
The Most Dangerous Decades, Princeton University Press. 
16
 By voting Indira Gandhi out of the office, India showed its commitment both to democracy 
and to the intrinsic value of its institutions. 
17
 “Among nearly 5,000 candidates in the current election [n.b. the general elections of 
1998], hundreds are gangsters and criminals, men and women awaiting trial or already 
convicted but free on bail for crimes like murder, kidnapping and blackmail,” in Burns, John 
F.: The World; The Front-Runner in India Is Deep Doubt, New York Times, March, 1998.  
18
 Quoted in Cohen, 2001, p. 113. 
19
 See Mitra & Singh, 2009.  
20
 India “has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some temporarily, to 
deal with interethnic conflicts and centre-state conflicts as they have arisen”, Brass 1991: 343. 
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emerged, it was managed by means of a consociational practice in terms of 
constitutional and policy engineering. 
 
Compared to India, Sri Lanka’s road to independence began with far less 
turmoil. There were no such issues as balkanization of the country, e.g., such as 
secessionist movements as Dravida Nadu in South India. However, despite the 
favorable conditions analyzed below, Sri Lankan state policy, through enactment of 
language, employment, land settlement, and other policies gave rise to Tamil 
nationalism with its own claims to a “traditional Tamil homeland,” the demand for a 
separate state in the north and east of the island, the rise of militancy, the LTTE, and 
the devastating ethnic war. These conditions consequently caused the disintegration 
and de facto partitioning of the Sri Lankan state. 
 
The Constitution of 1948 established a Westminster style two-tiered 
parliamentary system of government comprising a Senate and a House of 
Representatives. From 1948 to 1956, minority issues were well into the fore in the 
first phase of the Sri Lankan political development. The governments of this period 
espoused an “integrative secularism” (Jayasuriya 2005: 8-10) based on an alliance 
between the elite of the dominant and minority groups, all of whom were drawn 
from urban, western educated classes. This was a period of responsive cooperation 
between two western educated groups best described as “elite accommodation,” with 
common interests in maintaining relative peace and stability. 
 
Despite the fact that at independence 70% of the population was Sinhalese and 
22% were Tamil, no riots occurred or any form of collective violence between 
Sinhalese and Tamils “for hundreds of years before Independence” (Stepan 2006: 1-
2). Wilson observed that “the consociational that could have cemented the 
foundations of a pluralist democratic society disintegrated in stages” (Wilson 1988: 
34). 
 
A policy based on the majoritarian control system was at the root of the ethnic 
conflict. The Westminster style form of parliamentary democracy introduced 
Sinhalese nationalists to an elementary principle of the democratic rule, which was 
understood to be the collective and general will of the ethnic-religious majority. Any 
deviation from the unitary state model was believed to endanger the unity, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the entire state of Sri Lanka. Thus, in 
the second phase, particularly from 1956 to 1983, the very aggressive nation state 
policies resulted in constructing two warring aspirant nation states in one state.
21
 
  
In reaction to the Sinhalese majoritarian practices, the Tamil minority had 
begun to articulate demands for power sharing since early 1950s. The argument was 
based on the fact that the state of Sri Lanka was the home of two nations: Sinhalese 
and Tamil. Tamil leaders argued that if two nations were to peacefully coexist in a 
single state, sovereignty and state power should be organized on the principle of 
federalism. 
 
The third phase began in 1983 and represented the start of a long and bloody 
civil war between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE (which by then emerged 
as the ‘sole spokesman’ of Tamil community). After a series of unsuccessful peace 
efforts, including the inglorious involvement of Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-
1990) and controversial Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (2002-2008), Sri Lanka’s 
President Rajapaksa started a decisive campaign of final annihilation against LTTE 
                                                        
21
 “There were many more Sinhalese votes to be had by being extreme than there were Tamil 
votes to be had by being moderate.” remarks Horowitz, 1989, p. 26. 
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in 2005, successfully completing it by May 2009. The end of war surely presents a 
window of opportunity to accommodate the demands of ethnic minorities through 
consociational power sharing arrangements.
22
 However, the paper focuses on the 
emergence and escalation of the ethnic conflict as well as radicalization of Tamil 
minority. 
 
Constitutional provisions 
 
a. India 
According to Weiner (1989), “India contains such a medley of religious, caste, and 
linguistic groups that the sense of belonging to a minority depends upon where one 
lives, how much power and status one has, and one’s sense of community threat,” he 
continues by stating “[...] to regard oneself as part of minority in India is to suggest 
that one ought to take group action to remedy one’s situation. To declare one’s group 
a minority is, therefore, a political act” (Weiner 1989: 101-102). 
 
The word minority is not defined in the constitution of India. However, the 
word appears in some Articles – 29 to 30 and 350A to 350 B. The 1992 National 
Commission for Minorities Act also avoids such a definition. Nonetheless, under this 
Act the government issued a list of minority groups, which included all religious 
groups (Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Zoroastrians)
23
 except Jains who 
were added at a later date. 
 
In terms of political rights, the Constitution of India adopted two methods for 
protecting the minorities: (1) the guarantee of what might be described as negative 
quality, which protected them from the possibility of discriminatory treatment, and 
(2) the guarantee of positive rights, also known as affirmative actions, to members of 
minority groups.  
 
Some of the special provisions of the Constitution are as follows
24
: Article 14 
confers equality before law; while Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
religion, caste, sex or place of birth; it permits the State to make "any special 
provisions" for women, children, "any socially and educationally backward class of 
citizens," and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 provides equality 
of opportunity in matters of public employment, while enabling the State to make 
provisions for the reservation in appointments of posts in favor of "any backward 
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in 
the services under the State". Article 15 refers to "any socially and educationally 
backward class of citizens" and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes without 
qualifying backwardness with social and educational attributes and without a special 
reference to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, whereas Article16 refers to "any 
backward class of citizens". Article 17 abolishes “untouchability.” Under the 
freedom of religion provision, Article 25 enumerates the right to freedom of 
consciousness and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion; Article 26 
                                                        
22
 The first steps towards a meaningful reconciliation between Sinhalese and Tamils are being 
made (see, for example, Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission or the constructive 
pressure of the international community) 
23
 Although a statistical majority, Hindus divided by language and caste do not have a clear 
political majority. Conversely, although a minority on the national level, all of India’s 
religious minorities form a majority in a given State or District.  Similarly, minority 
communities also have internal minorities, i.e. Muslim minorities, such as Urdu and Non-
Urdu speaking Muslims, Shias, and Sunnis. 
24
 This section draws heavily on the Constitution of India up to 94th Amendment Act, 
available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html. 
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applies to the freedom to manage religious affairs given to religious denominations 
or sections thereof; Article 28 applies to the freedom of attendance at religious 
instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. Article 347 
stipulates the special provisions relating to language spoken by a section of the 
population of a State, whereas Article 350 defines the language to be used in 
representations for redress of grievances; Article 350A assures facilities for 
instruction in mother tongue at primary stage and Article 350B provides for 
appointment of a Special Officer for linguistic minorities by the President. 
 
Cultural and Educational Rights are secured in Articles 29 and 30. Article 29, 
also known as protection of interests of minorities, declares in its first clause that 
“any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof 
having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to 
conserve the same.” Clause 2 of the same Article states: “no citizens shall be denied 
admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid 
out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language, or any of 
them” (italics added for emphasis) Article 30, Clause 1 states that “all minorities, 
whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and 
administer educational institutions of their choice,” whereas Clause 2 prohibits the 
discrimination against any educational institution on the grounds that it is under the 
management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. Thus, in fact, the 
Constitution does provide, albeit indirectly, a definition of minorities (!) in Article 
29, protection of interests of minorities: in the first clause, the text refers to 
minorities based on language, script, or culture; in clause 2 of the same Article, it 
does extend the definition. Given the above analysis descriptions, in India there are 
minorities clearly based on religion, race, caste and/or language. 
 
b. Sri Lanka25 
The Constitution of Sri Lanka does not provide a precise definition of “minority” as 
well. The concept of minority, whether religious or linguistic or in its plural or 
singular form, is missing from the constitutional provisions or other legal 
stipulations. The majority of people in Sri Lanka (74.5%) are Sinhalese, 
distinguished primarily by their language - Sinhala.  
 
In Sri Lanka’s Independence Constitution, the British Colonial Office adopted 
the Soulbury Commission’s views that the protection of ethnic minority rights 
should be sought through clauses preserved within a unitary State constitution. 
Under Article 29(2) it contained provisions that Parliament was not competent to 
pass laws that: 
 
(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; or 
(b) make provisions of any community or religion liable to disabilities or 
restrictions to which persons or other communities or religions are not made 
liable; or 
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage 
which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or 
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the 
governing authority of that body.
26
 
                                                        
25
 Until 1972 Sri Lanka was called Ceylon. I am aware of the fact that for historical and 
contextual appropriateness using the names interchangeably would be correct. However, I 
also use Sri Lanka for the period up to the 1972 Constitution. Nevertheless, Ceylon, will 
appear in official acts, agreements and quoted literature. Additionally, I think that using Sri 
Lanka “inappropriately” bears an additional meaning emphasizing the ethnic outbidding and 
nation-building policies long before 1972, i.e. Citizenship Act of 1948 or language provisions 
of 1956. 
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Article 29(2) represented certain guarantees
 
given to the minorities by the 
departing colonial government as a quid pro quo for their accepting a constitution 
establishing a unitary State for independent Sri Lanka, although de Silva rightfully 
observed that the lack of entrenched guarantees of fundamental rights, on the lines 
enacted in the constitutions of India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and other post-colonial 
states allowed the Sinhalese decision-makers to ignore it, passing laws most of 
which adversely affected the minorities (de Silva 1981: 511).
27
  
 
In contrast to the Soulbury Constitution, the current Constitution, promulgated 
in 1978,
28
 guarantees fundamental rights to every citizen,
29
 such as freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion (Articles 10), freedom from torture and cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment (Article 11). Article 12 secures the right to 
equality, whereas Article 13 stipulates the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention 
and punishment, and prohibition of retroactive penal legislation. The Constitution of 
Sri Lanka also guarantees, under Article 14(1)(a-i), the freedom of speech and 
expression to every citizen, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of 
association including the freedom to join a trade union, the freedom to manifest his 
or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, the freedom 
to promote his or her culture and to use his own language, the freedom to engage in 
any lawful occupation, profession, trade, business or enterprise, and the freedom of 
movement, residence including the freedom to return to Sri Lanka. 
 
Moreover, Chapter IV-Language proclaims under Article 18(1) that the Official 
Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and that “Tamil shall also be an official 
language” (Article 18(2)). The Constitution also regards English as the “link 
language” (Article 18(3)) 30. In this Chapter, an express provision appears permitting 
the use of Tamil language in Parliament, local government, courts, universities, 
schools and in official correspondence (Articles 20-24). Under Article 25, the State 
obliges itself to provide adequate facilities for the use of the languages provided in 
this Chapter. 
 
In contrast to India’s secular principle of sarva dharma samabhav (let all 
religions prosper, i.e., equal treatment of and respect for all religions), and despite 
the fact that there are other religious minorities, the Constitution gives Buddhism the 
foremost place. Article 9 of the Constitution proclaims that “the Republic of Sri 
Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty 
of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions 
the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).”31 Consequently, the constitution does 
                                                                                                                                               
26
 See the full text of Ceylon Constitution Order in Council 1946, which at Sri Lanka’s 
independence became the country’s first Constitution, at: 
http://www.tamilnation.org/srilankalaws/46constitution.htm.  Consider also Marasinghe, L. 
2004, p.14; de Silva, 1981, pp.510-539. 
27
 For the sake of equity one should add that the Constitution was a heritage from the British, 
not mentioning the fundamental rights because, “according to the British tradition, the 
protection of such rights is left to the due process of law,” in Rothermund and Kulke 2010, 
p.327. 
28
 Next section draws heavily on Constitution of Sri Lanka (as amended up to 17
th
 
Amendment, 3
rd
 October 2001), revised edition 2008, available at: 
http://www.parliament.lk/about_us/constitution.pdf,  
29
 Chapter III – Fundamental Rights. 
30
 Article 18(1-3) were amended by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1987. 
31
 This stipulation was already introduced in the 1972 Republican Constitution. Compare this 
to India, where “secularism” is one of the major principles of the Constitution, meaning both 
equal and due respect for all religions and faiths as well as separation of church and state. 
The preamble of the Constitution of India declared one of the objectives to be to secure to all 
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not have a provision similar to Article 26 of the Indian Constitution that provides 
guarantees to every religious denomination or a section of the article that grants the 
right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion and the right to establish and 
maintain institutions for religious purposes. A noteworthy detail is the inclusion of 
this principle in the Soulbury Constitution Article 29(2)(4) prohibiting the enactment 
of legislation restricting the free exercise of any religion or altering the constitution 
of any religious body without the consent of that body.  
 
India: consociational arrangements as conflict regulating practices 
 
At Independence, India had a completely (Westminster)-majoritarian constitution.
32
 
The Partition was still vividly present in the people’s consciousness. Communal 
violence preceding these events was painfully felt. The question the founding fathers 
and constitution-makers had to contend with was what kind of institutions and 
practices should be created to act as an incentive for ethnic groups to mediate their 
differences through legitimate institutions of a common democratic state? Other 
related concerns were how to prevent another “two-nation theory;” what relation 
should be between the state and religion; and whether religious minorities should 
continue to have “separate electorates,” reservations, or educational institutions. 
Additionally, almost six hundred princely states that were nominally sovereign 
entities not directly administered by the British, and having the free choice of 
“opting in” or “opting out” of India had to be incorporated. As Stepan pointedly 
observed:  
 
[b]y Benedict Anderson's standards there would appear to have been more than enough 
raw material for territorial nationalists to imagine (and attain) separate independent 
nation(s) in South India. In the last decades of the British Raj more than ninety percent 
of the population in South India spoke languages in the Dravidian family, all of which 
had their own scripts and were unintelligible to the major language of the North, Hindi. 
(Stepan 2006: 46-47). 
 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the introduction of universal 
suffrage and the “ending of the post-struggle for independence decennial bonus” 
have led some political analysts, following the lead of Selig Harrison (1960), to 
argue that India faced “the most dangerous decades,” which will eventually lead to 
its balkanization and collapse.  
 
Thus, according to the composite model for conflict regulation in plural 
societies, the role of the elite’s strategy, (i.e., formal and informal agreements), 
becomes pivotal. The strategy is the necessary piece of the conflict management 
puzzle. In India, the political elite constituted “the new priesthood […], partly 
because of the exemplary and saintly or the grand and heroic styles of men like 
Gandhi and Nehru, and partly because of the overriding importance of the politician 
in social life and his growing intimacy with society’s life processes” (Kothari 1994: 
268). In this sense, deciding on an Indian-state-nation-building process, instead of 
Hindu-nation-state-building,
33
 a high level of “constitutional patriotism”34 was 
achieved.  
                                                                                                                                               
citizens of India the freedom of faith, belief, and worship. The chapter on fundamental rights 
provided a constitutional guarantee to minority groups, incorporating a separate group of 
rights in Articles 25-28 focusing on the right to freedom of religion. 
32
 Consider also Brass’s observation: “Nehru writes that the Indian mind was ‘completely 
conditioned to believing that whatever was British was best’ and further states that no wonder 
that the Indian Constitution was but an “amended version” of the 1935 Government of India 
Act.”, in Brass, 1994, p. 149. 
33
 For the concept of “state nation” as opposed to “nation state” consider the excellent 
comparative article on institutional engineering: Linz, Stepan, and Yadav. “’Nation State’ or 
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a. Grand coalition35 
The period from 1947-1967 during which the Congress Party was the dominant party 
and governed alone is considered to be an instance of executive power-sharing.  The 
Congress Party was broadly representative and inclusive during this period, 
manifested by an internally federal organization, a high-degree of intra-party 
democracy, and a strong aptitude for consensus.  In the view of Lijphart’s assertion 
that “the combination of the Congress Party’s inclusive nature and political 
dominance has generated grand coalition cabinets with ministers belonging to all 
main religious, linguistic, and regional groups” (Lijphart 2008: 45-46), Congress 
cabinets accorded proportional ministerial portfolios to the Muslim and Sikh 
minority, as well as to the different linguistic groups, states, and regions of the 
country (Bogaards 2005: 173). Lijphart’s analysis draws heavily on Rajni Kothari’s 
description of the Congress Party as a system, characterized by a party of consensus 
that has assumed electoral and governmental dominance within competitive multi-
party system. However, there were limitations to the degree of consociationalism 
achieved within the Congress Party. Bogaards states that in India the federal 
structures provided “a crucial additional site of representation and accommodation 
supplementing – and in India ultimately substituting for – processes within the 
consociational party” (Bogaards 2005: 174). 
 
Regional parties represent another important factor because their support base is 
entirely local. The constituents identify with particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
groups, such as SAD for Sikhs, DMK and AIDMK for Tamils, MNF for Mizos, SDF 
in Sikkim but also BSP in the states of Bihar and UP, representing chiefly the 
interests of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) as well as other 
minorities. As constituents of a national government, they serve as “vehicles of 
regional identity” (Hardgrave 1993: 57), and due to the incentives of coalition 
politics, they function as watchdogs of minority rights guaranteeing that even the 
arguably not so minority-friendly parties such as BJP would have to reconsider and 
adapt their policies toward minorities.
36
 In terms of orientation, such parties as the 
DMK or SAD are categorized by Stepan as classic “centric-regional” parties, 
meaning they control not only the affairs of a given State, but they also have a say at 
the center in terms of seats or cabinet posts (Stepan 2007: 261). Thus, currently, 
grand coalitions could be considered in terms of multiparty coalitions,
37
 which are 
generally just as broad and inclusive of most geographic, linguistic, and religious 
interests as the Congress cabinets during the Congress-“System”.38 These 
                                                                                                                                               
‘State Nation’? India in Comparative Perspective” in Bajpai, 2007, pp.50-106; also Linz et al. 
2003 as well as Stepan, Linz and Yadav. 2011.  
34
 For “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) see Habermas, 1992: 603-651. 
35
 O’Leary (2005: 12-13) distinguishes between complete, concurrent, and weak democratic 
consociational executives, reaching the conclusion that consociational executives need not be 
all inclusive grand coalitions, i.e., do not have to include all segments in government, 
particularly in those cases in which there are numerous small ethnic minorities and categories 
of people—insignificant demographically, electorally, or politically—to be organized into 
any consociational settlement. 
36
 Additionally see: Mitra, Subrata K., 2005(b): “The NDA and the politics of ‘minorities’” in 
Adeney Katharine and Saez, Lawrence, eds., Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism, 
Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies, Routledge. 
37
 National Democratic Alliance consisted of as many as 23 parties, currently BJP-led 
coalition has eight and Congress-led coalition- United Progressive Alliance- nine; Third 
Front alliance ten parties, see: India Elections (result, coalitions), available at: 
http://www.indian-elections.com/alliances/ 
38
 On coalitions that moderate the conflict see also the case study of Kerala in Horowitz, D. 
L. 1993. “Democracy in Divided Societies”, Journal of Democracy. 4(4). pp. 33-35. 
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developments point to a flexibility and dynamism that refute the criticism of 
‘immobilism’ usually expressed by the critics of power sharing.  
 
b. Segmental autonomy as symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism 
In India, the federal states were drawn to correspond to ethnic variations as a 
response to collective protest, such as the pursuit of a homeland (i.e., segmental 
autonomy; for those groups with a territory and no state of their own, sufficiently 
well organized to articulate the demands politically, converting their minority status 
into a majority one). The States Reorganisation Act of 1956 (incorporated into the 
Constitution as Seventh Amendment Act) constituted the first step in meeting these 
demands. Horowitz pointedly remarked that “devolution of a generous share of 
power upon largely homogenous federal units promises a dramatic reduction in 
conflict at the center.” Hence, many issues are contested within ethnic groups rather 
than between them, because many of them become State-level issues (Horowitz 
1993: 35). 
 
Additionally, Article 3 of the Constitution allows the Parliament to form new 
states, as well as alter the areas, boundaries, or names of existing States. This 
provision has led specialists to describe India as “quasi-federal” (Wheare 1966: 35). 
This notion, however, is contrary to historical events, because it has enabled the 
Union to react more flexibly to the separatist demands and it has provided incentives 
for the self-determination movements to struggle for a “homeland” within the Indian 
Union. One should compare the bear facts to be able to grasp the effectiveness of 
this Article. As a result of the Seventh Amendment (i.e. the States Reorganisation 
Act) India was reorganized into 14 States. Currently, the country comprises 28 States 
and seven Union territories, and the number could grow in the future.
39
 
Conclusively, federal arrangements proved to be a robust and successful mechanism 
in coping with secessionist and sub-national movements, as exemplarily shown in 
the Table below
40
: 
 
Table 3. India: Minority demands and symmetrical (ethnic) federal arrangements
41
 
 
Minorities  Territorial Aspiration Result  
Tamil nationalism Autonomous Tamil Nadu  achieved (1956) 
Naga nationalism Autonomous Nagaland achieved (1963) 
Sikh identity Punjab along linguistic lines achieved (1966) 
Mizo Nationalism Autonomous Mizoram achieved (1987) 
Jharkhandi identity Autonomous Jharkhand achieved (2000) 
Gorkha identity Autonomous Gorkhaland  achieved (2011) 
Kashmiri identity Undivided Kashmir ongoing 
Telugu identity Talangana state ongoing 
 
The Official Languages (Amendment) Act of 1967 is another conflict-regulating 
law with an accommodating, power-sharing vein by means of which “a multiplicity 
of major peoples, defined primarily in terms of language, were recognized as 
corporate groups within the Indian Union with rights equal to all other such groups.” 
                                                        
39
 For statistics, see Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. For forecasts, see the debates 
about the creation of a States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) to consider the formation of 
new states by carving them out of, i.e., Uttar Pradesh or Andhra Pradesh.  
40
 The Table is adapted from Mitra (1999a, p.200) and has been modified updated.  
41
 For an elaborate and vivid analysis federal design and practice in India, see Mitra, Subrata 
K. (2011) Politics in India, Structure, Process and Policy. Oxford: Routledge, Chapter 5 
“The federal structure: balancing unity and diversity,” pp. 87-108. 
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(Brass 1994: 149) Accordingly, each State in India has its own official language, 
although central government business is conducted either in Hindi or in English.  
 
Moreover, several states in India, Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370, as 
well as Northeastern States under Article 371 are afforded special rights and 
protections not available to the rest of the states - an instance of asymmetrical 
federalism. Subsequent legislation even prohibits citizens from other States to settle 
and buy land in Kashmir (Parekh 2006: 191). 
 
Another example of asymmetrical federalism is the right of religious and 
linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own schools, fully supported by 
public funds and granted in Article 30 of the Constitution. Under the aegis of this 
law, two types of religious schools have been organized by the four major religious 
communities: (a) religious institutions aided by a particular community and (b) 
religious schools aided by private or government agencies (Tremblay 2005: 208). 
Linguistic minorities whose languages have been included into the Eighth Schedule 
of the Constitution have the same right under Article 30. According to Ministry of 
Home Affairs’ Report, of the total population of India, 97.6 percent have one of the 
Scheduled languages as their mother tongue.  
 
With regard to the spirit of accommodation of religious minorities, the 
Constitution, based on Articles 25 and 26, allows the religious communities to 
adhere to their personal laws in the governance of their communities in spheres such 
as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The controversial 1985 Shah Bano decision by 
the Supreme Court, made Shah Bano, a 62 year old Muslim woman in search for 
alimony, the poster child for the construction of community identity and rights as a 
community. In support of reversing the Court’s decision, Jamiat Ulama-I-Hind, one 
of the leading Islamic organizations in India, made the following statement: “the 
demand [for a personal code] is tantamount to a fundamental departure from the 
position that, in the present-day situation, where the Muslim community is deeply 
entangled in a struggle for the search and safeguard of its self-identity, it is only 
personal law that can be a permanent guarantee of its preservation.”42 Consequently, 
the new Muslim Women Act (Protection of Right on Divorce) was adopted in 1986, 
largely in line with the wishes of the Muslim Personal Law Board. Phillips, 
describing the view of Indian feminists, observed that before the Shah Bano events, 
Indian feminists supported a uniform civil code. After the Act was enacted, however, 
feminists have been much divided on the issue, but “virtually none now argues for 
state imposition of a uniform civil code; the main options instead being either reform 
from within of the various personal law systems, or a state-sponsored civil code that 
operates in some way alongside personal law” (Phillips 2005: 128). 
 
c. Proportionality as reservations43  
According to Lijphart (2008: 48), the electoral system of power-sharing 
democracies, engenders proportional representation. However, based on the fact that 
linguistic minorities, as well as Muslims in Kashmir, Sikhs in Punjab, and Christians 
in the Northeast are mainly geographically concentrated, the plurality winner-take-
all electoral system present in India does not disadvantage them. Moreover, as 
previously observed, there are “centric-regional” parties, such as DMK or AIADMK 
in Tamil Nadu, or Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh which obtain a share of 
power also on the national level.  
                                                        
42
 Quoted in Chandhoke, Neera. 2002. “Individual and Group Rights”, p. 230. 
43
 Lijphart (1996: 261; 2008: 60) states that “consociational interpretation does not fit India’s 
caste conflict as well as it fits the linguistic and religious divisions” (emphasis added).  
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Additionally, the state sought to reverse the injustices incurred upon Scheduled 
Castes
44
 (former untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes by both adopting constitutional 
safeguards and enacting affirmative action programs that provided not only equal 
protection in law but also “reservation” of seats in the state assemblies and 
Parliament. These measures taken by the state demonstrated its commitment to 
reservations.
45
 
 
Constitutional safeguards, national and state policies, as well as formation of 
special Ministries and Commissions (to monitor and investigate, and evaluate 
policies’ implementation) led to political mobilization of the lower castes. Weiner 
(2001: 200) pointedly observed that: “a half-century after independence, the chief 
ministers of most of India’s states were non-Brahmins, some from the middle castes, 
but many drawn from the backward castes. The chief minister of UP was a scheduled 
caste woman. In August 1997, India elected K.R. Narayanan, a member of scheduled 
caste, as the country’s president.” Currently, the largest state of Uttar Pradesh is run 
by a schedule caste woman whose party (BSP – a party that represents the 
minorities, including SC, ST and OBCs) won the majority in the State elections. 
 
Apart from reservations in parliament and state assemblies, Article 335 of the 
Constitution provides reservations of jobs for SCs and STs in the administrative 
services, whereas the Reservations in Admissions Act provides reservations of 27 
percent of seats to OBCs in higher educational institutions.  
 
The statistical data available on the evolution and effects of reservation policy 
in India
46
 confirms Narain’s brilliant observation concerning the empowerment 
through positive discrimination, stating that “almost a bloodless social revolution 
could be accomplished through the democratic process, under which the deprived 
strata of society are being brought into the national mainstream” (Narain 1976: 916). 
 
Finally, a policy of reservation for religious minorities was enacted by the State 
Governments of Kerala and Karnataka, representing an important paradigm shift in 
reservation policies, given that reservations for religious minorities were previously 
excluded from the political agenda due to memories of the past, that is, Muslim 
separate electoral constituencies under the British rule.  
 
d. Demand for security - minority veto 
Lijphart states that the minority veto in power-sharing democracies usually 
consists merely of an informal understanding that minorities can effectively protect 
their autonomy by blocking any attempts to eliminate or reduce it (Lijphart 2008: 
49). The informal veto right shows a higher level of trust among groups than a 
formal veto, and it is also more efficient when not too often exercised.  
 
In India, the minority veto is not constitutionally entrenched. However, it 
occurred on several occasions as illustrated below: 
Table 4. Instances of minority veto 
                                                        
44
 The name “Schedule” comes from an official list, or schedule, that gave the “Scheduled 
Castes” (SCs) their name. Originally compiled by civil servants in the 1930s, the current 
version shows 1,091 Scheduled Castes.  Quoted from: Reservation in India, 2002, available 
at: http://www.ambedkar.org/News/reservationinindia.pdf. 
45
 In 1979, the Government of India appointed a commission, known after its chairman as the 
Mandal Commission, to consider the proposal for extending reservations to the Other 
Backward Classes (conceived also in terms of caste). 
46
 Consult for example Representation of the SCs, STs and OBCs in Central Government 
Cervices, available in Government of India, Report of the NCRLM, 2007, p.125. 
Radu Carciumaru 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  7 0 ,  D e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2                                                  15 
Implications for… Issues  Result Minority Veto  
Nation building  Hindi as the sole official language  Not passed  succeeded 
Ban on cow slaughter  Passed (Gujarat 2000) failed 
School prayers (Vande Mataram – compulsory)  Not passed  succeeded  
Rewrite text-book in a manner so as to glorify 
Hindu heroes over Muslim rulers  
Not passed succeeded  
State formation  To control/check the growth of madrasas 
(Muslim schools)  
Not passed succeeded  
Prevention of Terrorism Bill (many Muslims held 
without trial)  
Not passed succeeded  
Social justice  Uniform Civil Code  Not passed succeeded  
Women's Reservation Bill (1/3 in Parliament and 
State Legislatures)47  
Not passed succeeded  
 
In case of the unsuccessful veto in Gujarat, the bill was passed with the 
unanimous support of both the BJP and the Indian National Congress, an 
unavoidable result as Mitra pointedly remarked: “as in Sri Lanka, the minority has 
no chance when the two major parties agree.” (Mitra, 2005b: 85) 
 
 
Sri Lanka: From power sharing to majority rule 
 
a. Favorable conditions at the Independence 
Formerly the British colony of Ceylon, Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1948 
with a promising future anticipated by its own people and by outside observers alike. 
There was a basis for such optimism. Sowell observes that although the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils differed in ethnicity, language, and religion there was much evidence 
of goodwill across the social lines that divided them. The elites of both groups were 
Westernized, English-speaking, and cosmopolitan, and were accustomed to working 
together. (Sowell 2004: 78) 
 
Favorable conditions had emerged from the fact that “of the ten newly 
independent countries of South and South East Asia, Ceylon has more of the 
attributes of a modernized social and political system than any other” (Wriggins 
1965: 6). Some of these attributes were 60 percent literacy rate, the highest per 
capita income of any country in Asia except for Japan and the civil service that by 
1949 was almost exclusively indigenous. (Wriggins 1965: 66-8; 100-1; 458-70) 
 
According to Wilson, “the unexpressed premise of the Soulbury Constitution 
was a consociational arrangement between the English-educated elites, of all 
island’s principal groups: communal (Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim), religious 
(Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant) and social (the various castes 
among the Sinhalese and Tamil communities).” Aside from Article 29, the 
consociational arrangements included other important safeguards, such as 
“weightage in representation including Appointed Members (not exceeding six in 
number) in the popular House of Representatives, a second chamber (the Senate), 
[…] and independent public services and judicial services commissions” (Wilson 
1988: 34).  
 
                                                        
47
 Although the Bill has been passed in Rajya Sabha (the Upper House) in 2010 already, it is 
still pending in Lok Sabha (the Lower House), facing a fierce opposition mainly from SC or 
OBC Parties, which fear their reservation quota being diminished as it will particularly, if not 
exclusively, help women from high- or middle class families to enter politics. See No 
consensus at all-party meeting on Women's Reservation Bill, at: 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/no-consensus-at-all-party-meeting-on-women-s-
reservation-bill-113967.  
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 Relations among the various ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka were 
described by an American scholar as "cordial, unmarred by the sort of friction that 
exists between Hindus and Moslems in India" (Sowell 2004: 79). This 
accommodative pattern was not confined to the elites or to politics. In general, the 
situation seemed to provide an impressive basis for a successful start in state- and 
nation-building. 
 
b. Majoritarian practices and gradual minority exclusion 
Strict definable stages are discussed in this section that led to the escalation of an 
incipiently mild conflict into a full-blown war on secession and a near break-down of 
the state. These stages include both cause and effect as well as action and reaction 
variables. On the part of the Sinhala elites, the causes lie in the development of a 
majoritarian control strategy concerning policy implementation and institutional 
engineering. On the part of the Tamil minority, the conflict can be traced to 
radicalization of their demands from parity within a unitary state to commitment and 
pledge of loyalty to the idea of a separate state of Tamil Eelam. In chronological and 
conflict-escalation order, the stages are as follows: Citizenship Act of 1948, peasant 
settlement policies, Official Language Act of 1956, affirmative action policies such 
as University Entrance System of 1972, also known as policies of standardization, 
and the Constitution of 1972. 
 
Within a few months of independence, the government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 
enacted the Citizenship Act of 1948, eliminating the vast majority of Indian 
plantation workers (Upcountry Tamils) from the electoral registers by the simple 
strategy of defining the right to citizenship far more rigidly than previously. Along 
with the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, the two Acts 
completely changed the representational landscape. Quoting the Sinhalese political 
scientist I.D.S. Weerawardena, Wilson writes that the disfranchisement of the 
Indians was “a broken pledge to all the minorities.” He added, “[the] moral basis of 
the Soulbury Constitution has been wiped away” (Wilson 1988: 18-19). 
 
The disfranchisement of the Upcountry Tamils meant that the Tamil vote was so 
small that i t  could be disregarded. This resulting lack of representation created a 
rival strategy on how to best compete for the votes of the Sinhalese majority 
(Horowitz 1989: 21-22). Consequently, Sri Lanka's party system has revolved 
around the competition against the two main Sinhalese parties for Sinhalese votes  
and competition within the two main Tamil parties for Tamil votes (until the two 
Tamil parties merged in 1972). Disfranchisement had direct consequences on the 
shift of intent of the language movement. 
 
According to Sowell (2004: 84), the demand to replace English by the two 
indigenous languages–Sinhalese and Tamil as main political languages–was made as 
far back as the early 1940s, but the transition from English was still not 
implemented. The slow progress is largely due to the caution of Prime Minister D. S. 
Senanayake, who sensed the explosive potential of issues like language and religion 
in a newly independent and ethnically divided country. 
 
However, despite the political union between the Sinhalese and Tamils, the 
resulting disfranchisement caused Sinhalese elite to use their power to institute 
Sinhala alone as the state’s official language. This political maneuvering led the two 
main Sinhalese parties, United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), “to outbid each other on who could provide the better deal for the Sinhalese 
community” (Sahadevan and Devotta 2006: 5)48. Consequently, the 1956 general 
                                                        
48
 Why a similar ethnic outbidding was avoided in India see pp.9-13. 
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election saw the institutionalization of the outbidding process. The key actor to make 
use of the opportunity to dismiss Tamil language rights was Bandaranaike, the leader 
of SLFP. Sowell (2004: 85) observed that Bandaranaike himself was not at all 
representative of those in whose name he spoke, but “he wanted to become prime 
minister—and he succeeded.”49 Bandaranaike campaigned on the simple idea of 
“Sinhala only and within twenty four hours.” The bill was introduced on June 14, 
1956 and passed nine days later. 
 
As in India, language policy in Sri Lanka became a focus of intergroup strife, 
because, apart from its symbolic value of group distinctiveness, it had the potential 
for having profound effects on educational and economic opportunities. 
 
Peasant settlement policies led to significant changes in the ethnic composition 
of Ampara and Trincomalee districts in the Eastern part of Sri Lanka. In Ampara, the 
Sinhala population increased from 5.9 percent to 17.7 percent while Tamil 
population declined from 50.3 percent to 46.4 percent and the Muslim population 
declined from 42.2 percent to 35.1 percent between 1946 and 1971. During the same 
period, the Sinhala population in Trincomalee district increased from 20.6 percent to 
28.8 percent and the Tamil population declined from 44.5 percent to 38.2 percent 
and the Muslim population increased from 30.5 percent to 32 percent.
 
 (Bandaranage 
2009: 46-47) 
 
The climax of “sinhalisation” of the state and imposition of the will of majority 
represented the Constitution of 1972. It abrogated the preceding constitution, which 
derived authority from the British Crown. According to Jayasuriya (2005: 12), the 
constitution, in essence, was meant to be an expression of a new nationalism as well 
as the embodiment of progressive socialist ideals of people’s power and centralized 
planning. However, the Sinhala Buddhist majority was the mainspring for the “new 
nationalism”. In this sense, the country’s colonial name, Ceylon, was replaced with 
Sri Lanka,
50
 whereas the foremost place was given to Buddhism (as already 
mentioned), virtually ignoring the presence of other religions (e.g., Hindu, Christian, 
and Muslim) in the country. This movement also removed the safeguards that had 
been in place to protect minorities, such as Article 29(2), and it incorporated the 
provisions of the Official Language Act of 1956. Thus, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism 
was institutionalized, becoming one with the state (see Diagram 1, below). 
 
The 1978 Constitution followed closely the contents of the 1972 Constitution. 
The only official language of Sri Lanka was still Sinhala (Article18), but in a new 
provision of the 1978 Constitution additionally to Sinhala Tamil was introduced, 
acting as the second national language (Article 19 and 21), the exact meaning of 
which was not clearly specified. Other changes were also made, such as the shift 
from a parliamentary to a presidential system or the introduction of proportional 
representation instead of plurality, that is, the FPTP-electoral system. 
 
                                                        
49
 Consider the following superb analysis: “Bandaranaike was both a utopian idealist and an 
avid opportunist, relentlessly pursuing short-term political gains. […] He had hoped to use 
chauvinism as a means to achieve power, believing that he could disarm it by making 
modest, long-overdue concessions to Sinhalese-Buddhist interests, and then by concentrating 
on reform to remove social injustice and soothe the anxieties of would-be communalists. He 
did not succeed […] very substantially because of the way Bandaranaike himself though and 
acted.” Manor, 1989, pp. 326-27. 
50
 A term used in ancient Indian epics over Sinhala, a pre-colonial name, which claimed the 
island as the land of the Sinhala people, in Bandarage, 2009, p.64.  
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Proportional representation, based on consociational theory, should have been 
an important benefit to and would have had an accommodative effect on minorities. 
However, as Horowitz brilliantly grasped, “[soon] after these changes came into 
effect […] conditions were anything but normal. The Tamil United Liberation Front 
[…] had been excluded from parliament; separatist violence had begun in earnest; 
and Sinhalese and Tamil opinion had become so polarized that, in the short term at 
least, no electoral system could foster moderation.”  (Horowitz 1989: 23) 
 
Representation is one of the primary concerns to the minorities. However, as I 
have argued, minorities have not stood a chance on vital matters of individual and 
group identity, social and economic opportunity, access to state sector employment, 
as well as the crucial issue for a plural society such as form and character of the state 
(unitary/federal and based on secular principles). On these central issues that had 
direct relevance to the majority group as well, the major political parties UNP and 
SLFP were either united or not flexible in their opposition. The “democratic 
stability”51 from an originally power sharing system to majoritarian “control” system 
was established. The Table below shows how the analyzed processes fit the pattern 
of the control system: 
 
Table 5. Majoritarian control system in Sri Lanka 
 
Control System Laws, policies and institutional arrangements  
The interest of the majority segment as 
perceived and articulated by its elite. 
Citizenship Act of 1948
52
; Official Language Act of 
1956; affirmative action; peasant settlement; 1972 
and 1978 Constitutions  
The majority segment extracts what it 
needs from the minority segment and 
delivers what it sees fit. 
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 
1958
53
; proportional representation, 1978.  
No bargaining between elites of the 
majority and minority segments.  
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact; Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pact
54
 
The bureaucratic apparatus of the state 
benefits the segment which it represents. 
Citizenship question, University Entrance System 
of 1972; language policy, state employment etc. 
Legitimacy is reached by an elaborate 
and well-articulated group-specific 
ideology. 
Sri Lanka instead of Ceylon; Buddhism- foremost 
place, but also the “minority complex”
55
 
“puppeteer manipulating his stringed 
puppet” 
Solomon & Sirimavo Bandaranaike; J.R. 
Jayewardene. 
 
                                                        
51
 Some analysts usually point to the fact that from 1956 until 1977 six successive Sri Lankan 
general elections saw incumbent governments defeated at the polls, evaluating it as a pattern 
for stable democracy (see Wagner 1999, p.912). However, democracy means more than 
holding elections.  
52
 For a superb overview of India’s citizenship acts, which have become more inclusive, see 
Mitra, Subrata K. “Citizenship in India: Preliminary Results of a National Survey, 2009”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, no. 9: Feb. 27, 2010, pp. 46-54. Additionally, see Mitra, 
Subrata K. ed., (2012) Citizenship in the Era of Globalization: Structure, Agency, Power, and 
the Flow of Ideas, New Delhi: Samskriti. 
53
 This act provides for Tamil as the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces where the Tamils are the majority of the population. However the provisions of 
this act, implemented only in 1965, were never carried out. See Jayawardane, 2006, p.234. 
54
 Both pacts could be retrospectively perceived due to “ethnic outbidding” and a lack of 
concessions that could be a detriment to the majority as pseudo-bargaining efforts.  
55
 Although a clear majority on the island, the Sinhalese see themselves as a minority 
endangered by the larger Tamil community in India and northern Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu 
alone is almost double the geographic area of Sri Lanka and also more than three times its 
population.  
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The findings in Table 5 show that by 1978 a system of ‘control’ by Sinhalese 
majority of Tamil minority was established. The significance emerges from the fact 
that it enables testing the second hypothesis, which states that in a plural/deeply 
divided society majoritarian practices will exacerbate rather than regulate a conflict. 
Consequently, a radicalization of Tamil demands should be expected. 
 
c. Radicalization of Minorities’ Demands  
The policies of majoritarian “control” system resulted in a gradual increase in the 
minority ethnic group’s demands. After the disfranchisement of the Upcountry 
Tamils, one of the leaders of the All Ceylon Tamil Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, left 
the party with the argument that the Tamils needed a territorial electoral base in the 
north to protect Tamil interests. The implementation of the Official Language Act of 
1956 resulted in several long-lasting and unsolvable problems including the struggle 
for secession that subsequently surfaced. Declining prospects for education and 
employment faced by many Tamils as a result of standardization policies led to, at 
first, peaceful protests in parliament and throughout the country, especially among 
the students. This in turn led to anti-Tamil mob attacks “in the frenzied atmosphere 
whipped up by Sinhalese politicians and Buddhist monks” (Sowell 2004: 87) that 
resulted in at least 150 Tamils killed. Affirmative action in Sri Lanka led not to 
“ceylonisation” (Wriggins 1960) but to its sinhalisation, an exclusively tailored 
movement that suited the needs of the majority instead of polity-wide measures of 
inclusion and empowerment of discriminated minorities according to its plural ethos. 
Eventually, sinhalisation led to the politicized younger groups “take up arms against 
a sea of troubles and win or lose in the resulting war” (Wilson 1988: 39). 
 
The diagram bellow illustrates succinctly the consequences of majoritarian 
practices (1948-1983) in terms of four dependent variables: conflict escalation (from 
1948 onwards), progressive identification of the state with the Sinhalese majority (I), 
legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state for Tamil minority (III) and minorities’ 
accommodative policies (II),
56
 which are explained in terms of state policies (blue 
line) and Tamil minority demands (red line). The diagram impressively shows how 
in spite of a common point of departure at the independence and peaceful 
coexistence between communities, by 1983, the Sri Lankan state ceased to represent 
a legitimate arena to settle the conflicts politically, as Sri Lankan Tamils pulled out 
of the Parliament (see Legend, letter ‘g’) and chose bullets instead of ballots. On the 
other hand, the process of sinhalisation of politics, culminating with a full 
identification of the state with the Sinhalese majority started even earlier, namely 
with the Constitution of 1972.
57
 Representing a visualization of the second 
hypothesis, the diagram shows how each ‘control’ system-based state policy (A-I) 
triggered an opposite reaction, intensified the conflict and lead to the radicalization 
of Tamil’s demands (a-g) .  
 
 
                                                        
56
 It is generally accepted that at the independence Sri Lanka had a rather consociational than 
a majoritarian constitution, which presupposed ‘iron-clad guarantees’ for minorities; see also 
pp. 13-14. 
57
 For example, see Article 9 which gives Buddhism the foremost place. Compare this to 
India, where “secularism” is one of the major principles of the Constitution, meaning both 
equal and due respect for all religions and faiths as well as separation of the state from the 
church. The preamble of the Constitution of India declared one of the objectives to be to 
secure to all citizens of India the freedom of faith, belief, and worship. The chapter on 
fundamental rights provided a constitutional guarantee to minority groups, incorporating a 
separate group of rights in Articles 25-28 focusing on the right to freedom of religion.  
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Diagram 1. Emergence and escalation of Sinhalese-Tamil conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The critical junction framework presented in the diagram above, based on a 
chronological pattern, shows that the escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka followed 
an almost deterministic path. In India, however, the power sharing policies had a 
deescalating and conflict managing effect.  
 
Bottom-up perceptions of top-down arrangements 
 
The survey data presented in this section allow me to complete the analysis by 
bridging the gap between policy implementation and its acceptance, that is, the 
divide between elite-driven policies and the efficacy of institutional engineering 
concerning the accommodation of the demands of both minorities and majorities and 
the legitimacy “in the eyes of the masses” of elite’s enterprise to manage diversity.  
 
Thus, majority-minority status does not make a difference in India, whereas in 
Sri Lanka minorities are more supportive of democracy than the Sinhala majority. 
For example, 55 percent of Sri Lanka Tamils and 51 percent Muslims are strong 
democrats as opposed to only 31 percent of Sinhala Buddhist majority.
58
  
 
Aside from their democratic support, minorities and other marginalized groups 
in India have exhibited a growing sense of political efficacy and legitimacy for 
power sharing arrangements, whereas in Sri Lanka minorities declare that their 
conditions have deteriorated (SDSA 2008: 74). 
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 State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report. 2008: 20, 228.  
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LEGEND: 
State policies: 
A- Citizenship Act;  
B-Land settlement policies; 
C-Official Language Act; 
D-Sinhala-Tamil riots; 
E-Standardization, other 
affirmative actions; 
F- 1972 Constitution; 
G- 1978 Constitution; 
H- PTA 1979; 
I- Sixth Amendment 
 
Tamil reaction: 
a- Tamil Federal Party;  
b- 1956 Declaration; 
c- Satyagraha; 
d- Chelvanayakam-
Bandaranaike Pact; 
e- Tamil United Front; 
f- Vaddukoddai 
Declaration; 
g- TULF PMs pullout of the 
Sri Lankan Parliament. 
1948 
1983 
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Table 6. India: Political efficacy and legitimacy of democracy among marginalized 
groups
59
  
 
 Political efficacy Support for Democracy 
Year 1971 1996 2004 1971 1996 2004 
National Average 48 59 68 43 69 72 
ST 31 48 59 41 66 68 
SC 42 60 65 38 67 69 
Illiterate 36 47 55 31 62 61 
Women 36 51 61 32 64 67 
Very poor 38 51 60 32 64 66 
Poor 43 55 68 37 68 71 
Muslims 50 60 66 40 72 73 
 
Table 7 shows that despite the controversial issue of personal law, there exists 
both cross-party and minorities’ acceptance of the legitimacy of separate civil code 
for every religious community in India: 
 
Table 7. India: Separate civil code for every community (Mitra 1999a: 280) 
 Congress BJP NF LF BSP Total 
Disagree 29.6 36.3 28.6 22.0 30.0 30.1 
Don’t Know/No 
opinion 
24.3 23.3 29.1 18.3 25.1 25.4 
Agree 46.1 40.4 42.2 59.7 44.8 44.5 
Support for Separate Civil Code (%) 
Hindu 41 
All 45 
Sikh 51 
Christian 53 
Muslim 67 
 
In terms of “majoritarianism,” the following results shed light on my argument 
that in Sri Lanka democracy was understood in a rudimentary way as a majority rule. 
Instead of “majorities,” as in a consociational democracy, only with the will of the 
majority segment was reckoned. The results are noteworthy because they compare 
majoritarian mindset of majority religious communities in India and Sri Lanka.  
 
Table 8. “Majoritarianism” in Sri Lankan and Indian Majority Religion60 
 
 
 Sri Lanka  India 
Majority 
Buddhist 
Majority 
Hindu 
Those who strongly agree or agree that  
“In a democracy the will of the majority community must prevail” 
89.1 48.3 
Those who strongly disagree or disagree that “Giving equal 
treatment is not enough, the government should give special 
treatment to minorities” 
76.8 29.2 
“Strong majoritarians” on composite index 26.9 6.7 
 
 
                                                        
59
 Source: India, National Election Study, various years, quoted in Linz et al. 2007: 101. 
60
 SDSA, quoted in Stepan, Alfred. 2006, p. 25. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
There are several lessons that should be drawn from the analysis of the case studies.  
 
India’s case study supported the first hypothesis that in a plural and divided 
society conflict-regulation can be achieved only through adoption of consociational 
arrangements, In addition to the analysis with regard to accommodation, 
empowerment, securing both individual and collective rights and political integration 
of the minorities in India, a strong point was made in favor of implementation of 
consociational arrangements for conflict-regulation in plural societies in general. 
Additionally, the findings have refuted consociationalism’ s critics lead by Brass’s 
stance, according to whom a fully-developed consociational system would be 
‘inherently undemocratic’ and would ‘violate both the rights of non-recognized 
groups and the rights of individuals,’ and that the recognition of group rights would 
not require consociational democracy (Brass 1991: 334). The Indian State did not 
always accomplish it through a formal amicable agreement but achieved it through 
the quintessence of a consociational democracy - power sharing. Supported by 
constitutional stipulations, Weiner’s findings, and survey data, the paper showed that 
through consociational arrangements the conflicts emerging from the demands of 
minorities, such as homeland, linguistic recognition, reservation, and security were 
met. 
 
Sri Lanka followed a diametrically opposed strategy. Despite consociational 
arrangements, safeguards for minorities, and arguably polity-wide parties (UNP), Sri 
Lanka’s elites have chosen a majoritarian control system which ultimately 
transformed the Sri Lankan Tamil stakeholders from “politicians in Parliament, 
[in]to guerillas in the jungle.” (Stepan 2006: 9-10) Hence, the second thesis, in a 
plural and deeply divided society majoritarian practices will exacerbate rather than 
regulate a conflict, was also supported.  
 
According to the composite model of conflict regulation in plural societies, elite 
agency is critical in the conflict-regulating process. In both case studies, it had a 
galvanizing effect on and played an important role in accommodation or 
radicalization of conflicts emerged from minorities’ demands for a share of power 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Case-applied composite model for conflict regulation in plural societies  
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After over 60 years of majoritarian policies and over twenty years of civil war, 
the favorable conditions Sri Lanka profited from at the beginning are certainly 
charred. The end of war on secessionism in Sri Lanka certainly continues to bring 
new hopes for comprehensive policymaking and institutional engineering, for 
reconciliation and meaningful integration. Winning the trust and confidence of 
minorities will be a difficult, but not a futile endeavor. First steps (e.g., Lessons 
Learned and Reconciliation Commission) are done, but there should be many more 
to come. While solutions have to be homegrown, to be legitimate at least, Sri Lankan 
stakeholders and decision-makers need to keep an open-mind, let go of regional 
animosities and look at, if not be inspired from, the lessons India and other plural 
societies have learned from.
61
 Moreover, a durable and robust peace process will not 
be possible but with a principled participation of Chennai and New Delhi. 
 
The Sri Lankan case confirms how easily majoritarian democracy can degenerate 
into majority dictatorship. Although majoritarian policies and a system of imposed 
control on minority communities may assure a facade of peacefully managing the 
social diversity at first, they will sooner than later lead to not only radicalization of 
the originally mild demands but also to the exacerbation instead of regulation of 
conflicts. 
  
                                                        
61
 India’s conflict management palette, inexplicably ignored up till now, should be seriously 
considered. Other cases to draw lessons from are Northern Ireland, Canada, Spain or Belgium 
as well as cases of complex power sharing arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia. 
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